your Finnish example is outlandish as no such technology has ever had a one, two, three hundred year or more test, never mind a thousand year. So engineers puff out their chests and say they have solutions which are never are truly tested in real world situations. Buildings, dams, and bridges continue to collapse. Nuclear facilities continue to have accidents. At best present solutions to nuclear waste storage is a crap shot.

So Fukushima wasnt BADd ENOUGH

Dear Peter please send us an email to energytransition@us.boell.org

I have some knowledge of this subject which may add to the information sharing pool

For time differences I am in Western Australia

Well, I thought half of the article was about repositories..

Thank you for the reference. Well I do not know all the history, but it is a little bit strange that the safety case is analysed by te court, but not the regulatory body. Nether the less it says that: “the environmental impact assessment meets the requirements of the Environmental Code and can therefore be approved” and “ the investigation meets the high standards set out in the Environmental Code ”. While it still has some concerns about “the safety of the canister”.

So that does it mean. The copper canister (while very important in this design) is not the only safety barrier that ensures that radionuclides will not be leached in to the surface. Multiple safety barriers system is used (an engineered barrier system (EBS) within a low permeability host rock that serves as a natural barrier). The court does not say that it corrodes quicker it says that the corrosion rate estimated by the SKB has high uncertainty. Therefore, it means that more research might be needed (in a, b, c, d, and e points) to reduce uncertainty (and support SKB claim) or other safety barriers improved to overcome higher uncertainty of coper canister corrosion rate.

Of course! It’s always good to get feedback. The article addresses specifically long-term storage, which may be where we are crossing wires.

In Sweden, the Swedish Environmental Court has said that the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company must provide evidence that the repository in the long term will correct the following uncertainties regarding how the protective capability of the canister may be affected by:

a. corrosion due to reactions in oxygen-free water
b. pit corrosion due to reaction with sulphide, including the contribution of the sauna
effect to pit corrosion
c. stress corrosion due to reaction with sulphide, including the contribution of the sauna
effect to stress corrosion
d. hydrogen embrittlement
e. radioactive radiation impact on pit corrosion, stress corrosion and hydrogen
embrittlement.

I do not speak Swedish so am relying on this information:

http://mkg.se/en/translation-into-english-of-the-swedish-environmental-court-s-opinion-on-the-final-repository-for-sp

http://www.mkg.se/uploads/Summary_opinion_Swedish_Environmental_Court_regarding_proposed_final_repository_spent_nuclear_fuel_Forsmark_Jan_23_2018_(unofficial_translation_MKG).pdf

If this information is provided, they can go ahead.

How does this compare with Finland?

Yes, I totally agree with you regarding the social aspect. Therefore the proper information and public (better to say all stakeholders) involvement from the early stages of implementation of DGR is crucial to project success. A lot of attempts to implement the final disposal solution of SNF have failed because of mistakes in this field.

Hi, Silvia. Thank you for replay.

Nevertheless, I do not fully agree. First, I think you are misusing the terminology. The storage (to be precise interim storage) method is already in place. Usually the SNF is stored in special casks (dry storage) or in pools (wet storage). While I think, the first option is far more better, both options are used in practice and completely safe. Yet it is not the final solution and the SNF has to be properly disposed. At the moment there is the international consensus that deep geological disposal is the best option to dispose the SNF safely until SNF will not cause any threat. At the moment, the Finland’s ONKALO project is the leading project in the world regarding DGR. The reference you provided just confirms that I already have said, that the construction license is already issued.

Your claim that KBS-3 concept (copper canister in crystalline rock) is not safe… It is the first time I hear about it. Could you please provide the reference to support this claim? To me it doesn’t make sense, because the Finish regulator already issued the construction license based on the research and analysis that proves that this disposal method works and is safe.

By the way, the clay (bentonite) has nothing to do with the copper canister. It is used to seal the canister disposal shafts.